Cuban Missile crisis and Cold War intelligence Term Paper

Cuban Missile crisis and Cold War intelligence - Term Paper Example The hallmark of the Cold War was that though confrontations occurred between these two super powers in different parts of the world in their attempts to enhance their spheres of influence, they never came into direct conflict with each either. Instead proxies took up the cudgels for the two competing super powers in these conflicts. This characteristic of the Cold War was good for humanity, as both possessed nuclear weapons in enough quantities to destroy each other and the rest of the world. However, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 brought these two super powers close to direct conflict with each other and the possibility of nuclear destruction. The world watched with bated breath as the moves and counter moves went on for six days. The American ground forces were readied for the invasion of Cuba and the nuclear might of America was al set for delivery onto the Soviet. The order for these actions never came, as in the eleventh hour the Russian Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev decid ed use the option for defusing the tension provided by President Kennedy of pulling out the troublesome missiles from Cuba in exchange for non-invasion of Cuba pledge by the U.S.A (Divine, 1988). Background. In April 1961 a Cuban exile force armed and sponsored by U.S.A was sent into Cuba to remove Fidel Castro and the threat of communism on the door steps of U.S.A. The result was a disastrous defeat of the Cuban exile force at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Almost a year later the Defence minister of Cuba and younger brother of Fidel Castro paid a visit to the Soviet Union. The result of this visit was the despatch of Soviet Union military personnel and weapons to Cuba on the plea that Fidel Castro required the support of the Soviet Union to defend Cuba against any invasion of Cuba by U.S.A. (Garthoff, 1989). Republican protests on the large military build up in Cuba started in the U.S.A., which became even more strident, when photographs taken by a U-2 plane overflying Cuba, revealed ongoing construction work for a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site, which was taken to be defensive posture by the Kennedy administration. The CIA perception of this was that it could be the prelude t o the more ominous introduction of SAM’s with offensive potential. Though the Soviet Union continued to deny any offensive posturing, Republican pressure on the Kennedy administration for a response began to mount. Subsequent CIA U-2 provided even more disquieting news of the Soviet Union building launching sites for their medium-range ballistic missiles and long-range ballistic missiles (Divine, 1988). America needed to respond now. Two options of response were studied. The first involved the use of the American Air Force to bomb the missile sites. The second was a blockade of Cuba by the American Navy to prevent the transportation of any missiles to Cuba. The second option became the chosen response, for it provided the benefit of slow escalation. The Soviet response was to challenge the blockade. However, better sense prevailed and there was no attempt to break the blockade. Instead, the Russians agreed to withdraw the offending missiles, stop the missile site build-up, an d withdraw the Russian bombers capable of delivering nuclear bombs that were stationed in Cuba. In response U.S.A. declared that it would not invade Cuba (Divine, 1988). Cold War Intelligence Evaluation of the American intelligence activities from the start of the Cold